เศรษฐศาสตร์การเมืองว่าด้วยกฎหมายการแข่งขันทางการค้าและการลดความยากจน

Abstract

  This study examines how competition law affects poverty reduction across institutional contexts, using the Callaway-Sant'Anna Difference-in-Differences method with a Doubly Robust estimator on panel data from 179 countries over 1970-2014. Aggregate results are insignificant; outcomes are measured through quintile income shares and the Gini coefficient - evidence of a distributional channel linked to poverty reduction rather than a direct measure of poverty. Subgroup analysis reveals four patterns: (1) income level emerges as the strongest moderator; (2) redistributive effects concentrate in low-income countries; (3) upper-middle-income countries show a regressive tendency toward the bottom quintile - the HighMid Paradox; and (4) contrary to H2's prediction, formal institutional strength does not guarantee pro-poor outcomes, as de jure capacity rarely translates into de facto enforcement.
  Using Thailand as a case study, recurring patterns across the True-DTAC, CP-Tesco, and Honda cases are synthesized into the Institutional Transmission Blockage (ITB) framework, extending Williamson's (2000) institutional hierarchy through three blockages: Appointment Capture, Structural Capture, and Enforcement Gap - driven by concentrated interest groups operating outside public scrutiny.
  The findings suggest that competition law alone is insufficient and may exhibit regressive tendencies in upper-middle-income contexts. Institutional reform - particularly transparency in regulatory decision-making - may be an important precondition, particularly for upper-middle-income contexts.